Trust and security¶
Git-backed scans resolve Git from PATH, disable external diff and text-conversion
drivers, and request plain text patches with fixed prefixes and line markers.
Color preferences and binary diff attributes cannot hide changed Python lines.
Keep PATH limited to trusted tool directories, especially when scanning a checkout
from another contributor. The Git installation and its local/global configuration
are part of the trusted execution environment.
TestSeal is designed to inspect untrusted pull-request content without executing that content.
Trust boundary¶
The following inputs are untrusted:
- changed Python and snapshot content;
- paths and Git metadata from a contributor branch;
- unified-diff text;
- source-derived finding messages and evidence;
- repository TestSeal configuration in the checked-out revision.
The scanner treats these inputs as data. It does not:
- import changed modules;
- run pytest or project tests;
- load pytest plugins or
conftest.py; - evaluate decorators, constants, or configuration expressions;
- execute repository hooks;
- call an LLM or remote TestSeal service;
- send telemetry.
Executed programs¶
Git-backed modes invoke the git executable with argument arrays to resolve the
repository root, revisions, diffs, blobs, and untracked paths. Revision values
that begin with option syntax are rejected before Git runs.
The GitHub Action invokes Python and pip with argument arrays, without a shell. The default installation source is the TestSeal project bundled in the Action archive. It does not install the consumer repository.
GitHub permissions¶
Recommended workflow permissions:
Use the pull_request event. Do not provide repository secrets to the job.
TestSeal does not need write access to code, checks, pull requests, or packages.
Annotations are emitted through the GitHub Actions logging protocol.
Avoid pull_request_target with an untrusted head checkout. That combination
can expose trusted-context credentials to contributor-controlled files and is
outside TestSeal's supported threat model.
Configuration as policy¶
Repository configuration changes can weaken enforcement by:
- changing
fail_on; - excluding paths;
- disabling rules;
- lowering severities;
- adding fingerprint suppressions;
- changing guarding-test relationships.
Protect configuration and workflow files with normal review, code owners, and branch rules. TestSeal validates structure and known values, but cannot decide whether an authorized policy change is appropriate.
Reports are untrusted output¶
Finding text can contain source-derived evidence. Downstream systems must escape report values before inserting them into HTML, terminals with unsafe control handling, SQL, or shell commands.
The official Action passes annotations through the Actions toolkit and launches processes without string-built shell commands.
Availability limits¶
Very large patches or pathological Python syntax can consume CPU and memory. Public patch-processing services should enforce request size, process time, and memory limits around the CLI. GitHub workflows should use a job timeout.
Supported security reports¶
Report vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Include the affected version, impact, minimal reproduction, and suggested mitigation if known. Do not open a public issue for an undisclosed vulnerability.
The repository's disclosure process and supported versions are defined in
SECURITY.md.